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The Salience of Religion as a Social Background
Variable in Congressional Voting
RAYMOND T ATALOVICH
Loyola University of Chicago
and
BYRON

w. DAYN ES

DePauw University
With the pioneering legislative studies of Lowell' in the late 19th and
early 20th centuries, studies of voting behavior in Congress have become
increasingly numerous and sophisticated. The major research undertaken
by Rice, Truman, Turner, MacRae, and Froman 2 indicated that political
party affiliation is the strongest single determinant of legislative voting
while constituency acts as a secondary variable. Typically it reinforces party
voting, but is also can undermine party loyalty when counter-pressures in
the constituency operate. More recent research by Kingdon, Matthews and
Stimson, Clausen, and Cherryholmes and Shapiro 1 reveal other important
variables impinging upon the Congressman's decision-making, for
examples ideology, party and committee leadership cues, issues, state
delegations, and representational roles.
The body of empirical data on legislative voting is impressive, but there
remains a missing component in the existing literature. The major studies
do not include explicit reference to social background variables in their
inventory, and few scholarly articles have focused on this dimension.•
'A. L. Lowell, "The InOuence of Party Upon Legislation in England and America,"
Annual Report of 1he American Historical Association (1901 ), 321-343.
' Juliu s Turner, Party and Constituency: Pressures on Congress (Baltimore: Johns
Hopkin s Pre ss, 1951); Duncan Mac Rae, Jr., Dimensions of Congressional Voting (Berkeley:
University of California Pres s, 1958); David Truman, The Congressional Party (New York:
John Wiley and Sons, 1959); Lewis A. Froman, Jr., Congressmen and Their Constituencies
(Skokie, Illinoi s: Rand McNally, 1963).
' John W. Kingdon , Congressmen's Voting Decisions (New York: Harper and Row, 1973);
Donald R. Matthews and Jame s A. Stimson, Yeas and Nays: Normal Decision-Making in the
U.S. House of Representatives (New York : John Wiley and Sons, 1975); Aage R. Clause n,
How Congressmen Decide (New York : St. Martin 's Pre ss, 1973); Cleo H. Cherryholmes and
Michael J. Shapiro, Representatives and Roll Calls (Indianapolis: The Bobbs -Merill Company,
1969).
'Donald R. Matthews, The Social Background of Political Decision-Makers (Garden City,
New York: Doubleday and Company, 1954); Leroy N . Rieselbach, "Congressmen as 'SmallTown Boys ': A Research Note," Midwe st Journal of Political Science (May, 1970), 321-330
and "The Demograph y of the Congressional Vote on Foreign Aid, 1938- 1958," American
Political Science Review (1964), 577-588; Donald R. Matthew s, United States Senators and
Their World (New York: Vintage Book s, 1960); David W. Brady, John Schnidhauser, and
Larry L. Berg, '" Hou se Lawyers and Support for the Supreme Court," The Journal of
Politics (Augu st, 1973), 724-729.
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While these studies point that Congressional membership appears
sociologically atypical of a cross-section of American society, little effort is
made to point out the obvious implications of this on the representative process. Our review of textbooks on American government, s for example, indicates that none mentioned the impact of social background characteristics
on voting although all noted that social biases affected legislative recruitment. Legislative voting studies seem to give major attention to constituency
influence at the expense of background variables even though rather large
Congressional samples would permit rigorous statistical analysis. By contrast, students of judicial behavior put their major emphasis on the social
background of judges 6 while ignoring judicial constituency variables .
This paper will assess the literature and develop hypotheses concerning
the probable impact of social background attributes on Congressional
voting. Toward this end, eight variables were studied : (1) size of residence,
(2) geographic "mobility," (3) previous elective experience, (4) seniority
within the House of Representatives, (5) occupation, (6) religion, (7) age,
(8) region. For purposes of comparison, the analysis will include party
affiliation as well as four constituency variables (percent urban, percent
Negro, percent owner-occupied housing, and density) and electoral
marginality (percent margin of victory).
All but four variables studied are readily available 1 as numerical
'Martin Diamond, Winston Mills Fisk, and Herb ert Garfinkel, The Democra1ic Republic
(Chicago: Rand McNally and Company, 1971); Kenneth Prewitt and Sidney Verba, An ln 1roduc1ion to American Government (New York: Harper and Row , 1974); Marian D. Irish,
James W. Prothro, and Richard J. Richard so n, The Poli1ics of American Democracy
(Englewood Cliffs: Prentice -Hall, 1977); James MacGregor Burns and J. W. Pelta son , Governmen1 by !he People (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice -Hall, 1972); Milton C. Cummings, Jr. and
David Wise, Democracy Under Pressure (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1977);
Theodore J. Lowi, American Government: Incomple1e Conquesl (Hinsdale, Illinoi s: The
Dryden Press, 1976).
'Among the numerous studies of judicial behavior, see the following: Joel B. Grossman,
"Social Backgrounds and Judicial Decision-Making," Harvard Law Review (1966) 1551- 1564;
S. Sidney Ulmer, "Dissent Behavior and the Social Background of Supreme Court Ju stices,"
Journal of Politics (1970), 580-598; S. Sidney Ulmer, "Social Background as an Indicator to
the Votes of Supreme Court Ju stices in Criminal Cases: 1947-1956 Terms" American Journal
of Political Science (1973), 622-630.
' Information on party, age, occupation, religion, and seniority is found in the Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 89th Congress, Isl Session, Vol. XXI (Washington: Congressional
Quarterly Service, 1966), 34-37. The four constituency variables are listed in: United States
Bureau of the Census, Congressional Disrrict Data Book, 88th Congress (Washington: U.S.
Government Printing Office, I 963). Birthplace , experience, and size of residence were determined from: 89th Congress, 1st Session, Official Congressional Direc/Ory (Washington: U.S.
Government Printing Office, 1965) and Biographical Directory of the American Congress
(Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1971); U.S. Bureau of the Census, Census of
the Popular ion, 1970, Vol. I, "Characteristics of the Population" (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1973). The margin of victory was calculated on the basis of statis tics in:
Richard M. Scammon, America Votes 6: A Handbook of Contemporary American Election
Sta1is1ics(Washington: Governmental Affairs Institute, 1966) and Congressional Quarterly,
Guide 10 U.S. Elections (Washington: Congressional Quarterly, Inc . 1975).
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values. The exceptions are par ty affiliation, religion, occupation, and
region, and they were all assigned values for purpo ses of analysis. For
political party, Democrats were coded 1 and Republicans 0. Congressme n
were divided into two regional categories; Southerners 8 were coded 0 and
non-Southerners as 1. For religion, Catholics and Jews were coded 1 and all
other denominations as 0. And since the literature suggests that, compare d
to other occupations, lawyers hold a special relationship to the politica l
system, three classifications of occupations were constructed. Congressme n
with law as their only occupation were coded 2; those who designated law in
conjunction with other occupations were coded 1; and those Congressme n
engaged in non-legal occupations were coded 0.
As the dependent variable, the index used by Rieselbach, Cherryholmes
and Shapiro and others-the "federal support score"-is used . This index
coded any yea or nay vote by a Congressman in favor of greater involvement by the federal government 9 • The 89th Congress (1965-66) was chosen
for study because of the many important Great Society proposals-civil
rights, medicare, aid to education. Issues of this magnitude, we felt, would
bring added meaning to one's vote in favor or against increased federal involvement. Based on selected roll calls from both sessions of the 89th Congress, a range from Oto 23 is created. Only the Hou se of Representatives is
included in this analysis since its larger member ship is more heterogeneo us
than the Senate on the many social background variables chosen for study.
Excluded from the study were ten Representatives without a federal support
score (FSS). This gave us a workable universe of 425.
While our major purpose is to determine which social backgroun d
variables affect voting behavior and to measure their relative impact, the
direction of each coefficient will indicate which Congressmen are more supportive of an expanded federal role. By applying correlation and regression
techniques to all variables, moreover, the importance of backgroun d
variables relative to party, constituency, and electoral marginality can be
'Th e South includes the eleven states of the form er Co n federacy: Alaba ma, Mississippi,
Nor th Ca rol ina, Sou th Ca rolina, Ark ansas, Texas , Louis iana, Virginia, Florida, Te nnessee,
and Georgia.
'See Congressional Quarterly A lamanac, 89th Con gress, 2nd Session , Vol. XXII
(Wa shington : Con gression al Quarterly Service, 1966), 1008- 1009. Th e legislation and issues includ ed in these roll calls are: daylight savi ngs time, rent suppl ements (2), minimum wage, con sum er credit con tro l, open housing, civil rights, tr affic safe ty, War on Povert y (2), truth in
pac kaging, Demonstration Cities, App alachian Regional Develop ment Act , Elementary and
Second ary Edu cat ion Act, Medicare, housi ng de partm ent , votin g rights, right-to-work , Higher
Edu cation Act, Natio nal Found ation on the Art s and Hum anities, Clean Air and Water
Dispo sal Act, highway beautifi cation , Teacher Co rp s.
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delineated. To guide this study, eight hypotheses based on the theoretical
arguments and empirical evidence in the literature are provided:
1. Congressmen who reside in larger communities are more supportive
of FSS than those who live in smaller communities.
2. Congressmen who exhibit greater geographic "mobility" are more
supportive of FSS than those with less mobility.
3. Congressmen with more "experience" in previous elective office are
more supportive of FSS than those with less experience.
4. Congressmen with less "seniority" in the House are more supportive of FSS than those with more seniority.
5. Congressmen who are lawyers are more supportive of FSS than

those who are not lawyers.
6. Congressmen who are Catholic or Jewish are more supportive of the
FSS than those who are not.
7. Congressmen who are younger are more supportive of FSS than
those who are older.
8. Congressmen from regions outside the South are more supportive
of FSS than those from the South.
Table 1 presents a Pearson correlation coefficient matrix showing the
inter-relationships among all fifteen variables studied. Most relevant are the
correlations between each social background variable and the federal support score. The correlation between FSS voting and occupation, however, is
insignificant. The other seven are significant, and five are significant at very
high levels (p = .0001). Moreover, our hypotheses are sustained by the correlations between FSS voting and age, religion, mobility, region, and size of
residence. The data indicates, however that our assumptions about the impact of seniority and experience require re-examination.
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-. 124 -. 199 -. 609 -. 371 - .442 - .741
XXX - .036 - .093 - .403 -. 087
.027 - .256 - .037
- .054 - .028 - .01 I -. 041
.054
.008 - .036
XXX
. 104
.043 -. 031
.055 - .064 - .120
.698 - .059
.097 - .081
.196
.033 -. 093
. 104
XXX
.359 -. 577 - .o38 -. 140 -. 169
.244 - .007
. 176
.066
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.244 - .403
.043
.359
XXX - .135 -. 048
.015 - .281
- .501
.042 - .087 - .031 - .577 - .135
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.031
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.094
.488
.024
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.094
.066
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.too
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.586 - .098
- .181 - .069
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.269
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.398 - .125
.305 - .338
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.015
.188 -. 037 - .120 -. 169 -. 281
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.JOO
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XXX

.319

.319
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Within this table, any correlation with a value of .08 1 is significant at the .05 level. A value of. 104 is significant at the .0 1 level; a
value of .149 is significant at the .001 level; and a value of . I 76 is significant at the .0001 level.
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Size of residence and geographic "mobility" both address the question
of parochialism in the recruitment of legislative elites. In his well-known
study, Andrew Hacker 10 indicated that Senators were more parochial than
corporate executives in their backgrounds, and he hinted that such limited
experiences may hinder legislators in being able to understand the complexities of our economy. Rieselbach tried to determine whether Congressmen
as "small town boys" voted differently than their more urban
counterparts. 11 To gauge parochialism, he used three indices: size of birthplace, size of residence, and geographic mobility. He found that Representatives born in smaller towns and from smaller residences were less supportive of FSS voting, but there seemed to be no relationship to mobility. Our
data affirms this line of reasoning, vis., FSS voting is correlated to larger
residences and to greater geographic mobility.
The variables of age, occupation, and religion were given some attention by Donald Matthews. 12 His study of the 81st Congress indicated that
liberal Senators tend proportionately to be younger rather than older, to be
Catholic rather than Protestant, and to be professionals rather than
businessmen.
With regard to age, it can be argued that younger legislators are less
committed to traditional ideology and, over time, more amenable to the
changing agenda of issues. Presumably, these Congressmen would not
generally represent "safe" districts controlled by conservative interests.
Research by Duncan MacRae, Jr. 13 shows that age can displace the impact
of social status. He found that Massachusetts legislators who were younger
were under more cross-pressures than older ones and were less loyal to their
social status as a cue to voting on issues. Our data also shows that younger
Representatives are more supportive of FSS voting, but the correlation is
weak and barely significant.
That lawyers dominate American politics at all levels is readily apparent, and arguments are advanced in the literature which indicate that this
occupation is functional to the operation of the political system." Unlike
'°Andrew Hacker, "The Elected and the Annointed: Two Ameri can Elites," American
Political Science Review (September, 1961), 539-549.
" Leroy N. Rieselbach , "Congressmen as 'Sma ll-Town Boys': A Researc h note,: op. cit.
" Donald R. Matthews, The Social Background of Political Decision-Make rs, op. cit.
" Duncan MacRae, Jr., and Edith K. MacRae, "Legislators' Social Status and Their
Votes," American Journal of Sociology (May, 1969), 599-603.
"For examp les see: Hein z Eulau and John D. Sprague, Lawyers in Politics: A Study of
Professional Convergence (Indianapolis: The Bobb s-Merrill Company, 1964); Joseph A.
Schlesinger, "Lawyers and American Politic s: A Clarified View," Midwest Journal of
Political Science (1957), 26-39; P . L. Hain, "Lawyers and Politic s Revisited-Structural
Advantages," American Journal of Political Science (February, 1975), 41-51.
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businessmen, lawyers are trained and socialized-the argument goes-in
the process of negotiation and compromise. To this extent, they may be
more flexible on the issues and less likely to react to policy from a fixed
ideological position. The relationship between occupation and FSS voting,
as formulated in this analysis, is not significant; however, its direction indicated greater FSS voting by non-lawyer Congressmen.
The voting tendencies of Jewish and Catholic Representatives are
similarly liberal, indicative of their ethnic origins. One public opinion
study, for example, showed Jews and Catholics to be more "liberal" than
Protestants with regard to government's role in the society. ' 5 Our data confirms this expectation. A strong correlation exists between religion and FSS
voting and it seems to exist independently of other variables. While most
Catholics and Jews are Democrats, 16 there are fewer Democrats in Congress
who are Catholic or Jewish (thus the weak correlation between party and
religion, .188). Not surprisingly, most Catholics and Jews are from outside
the South, but the vast majority of non-Southern Congressmen are not
Catholic or Jewish. The correlation between religion and region, as a consequence, is only a modest .290. Furthermore, by calculating partial coefficients, it is determined that the impact of religion on FSS voting is sustained after controlling for party (.436), for seniority (.386), and for urban
variables (.363). Among all social background variables, only religion acts
independently of other factors.
The distinctive impact of region on American politics has long been
recognized. This has been particularly true of the South. Most Congressional voting studies impose controls for region. One of the well-known
Congressional voting blocs-the ''conservative coalition'' -takes account
of the importance of region. Southern conservatism is rooted in the Civil
War era, in the rural plantation economy and its "peculiar" institution of
slavery. It is sustained today by a new-found affluence caused by late industrialization and economic development. Among social background attributes, our study showed region to be fourth strongest, but highly interrelated to constituency variables (urban and Negro).
As measures of "professionalism" one's experience in previous elective
office and seniority within the House are used. The literature suggests that
" Wesley and Beverly Allinsmith, "Religious Affiliation and Politico-Economic
Attitudes," Publi c Opinion Quarterly (Fall, 1948), 377-389.
06
Among the Congressmen in the 89th Congress, religious denominations are
represented in the following proportions in the Democratic Party: Jewish-93.3;
Catholic-88.0;
Baptist-78.0; Methodist-67.1;
Lutheran-62.5;
Presbyterian-54.5;
and
Episcopalian-51.0.
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these variables might have differential impact. The assertion is made that
elites with greater experience in elective office-unlike
amateurs-are
less
ideological, more willing to compromise, and are more loyal to party
leadership. 11 Following this line of reasoning, greater elective experience
should aid FSS voting. The same could be said of seniority within Congress,
yet evidence to the contrary would suggest that very senior Representative s-committee chairmen-tend
to come from safe, homogeneous and
con servatively oriented districts . 18 However, it should be mentioned that
even should all twenty-one standing committee chairmen be very con servative, their roll call voting record would be minor in our univer se of 425
Representatives. As indicated by the correlations, experience is negatively
related to FSS voting. But how is this disparity explained? The intercorrelation matrix shows experience, senority, and age to be strongly interrelated.
Age correlates to experience (.698) but to less seniority ( - .501). The rever se
situation affects FSS voting; that is, voting for FSS correlates to younger
age, to less prior experience, and to more seniority. What the se linkages
suggest is that FSS voting is aided by Congressmen who typically enter the
Hou se at a younger age, without having had much previou s elective experience, and who , subsequently, are able to accumulate greater seniority
within the Congress. It would appear, therefore, that argument s against the
seniority system affecting committee assignments have less validity when
applied to the operation of the legislative system as a whole. To the extent
that seniority introduces '"profes sionalism'' into the law-making proce ss, it
aid s voting for an expanded federal role. And there are suggestions in the
data that previous experience may be less relevant to the legislative proces s
than ongoing experience in the Congress.
Seniority is the strongest social background variable (.488), but it appear s to be a function of party affiliation. That is, when a partial correlation is calculated with controls for party, the correlation between seniority
and FSS voting is reduced to .243.
Overall, the four strongest correlates of FSS voting are: party affiliation, seniority , religion, and percent urban. The literature confirm s that
party is most important; however, social background attribute s appear

I

" See James Q. Wilson, Th e Am ateur Democrat (Chicago : University of Chicago Press,
1966). C. Richard Hofs tette r gives som e emp irical sup po rt to Wilson 's argument in " Th e
Amate ur Politican : A Probl em in Co nstru ct Validatio n ," M idwest Journal of Political Science
(Februa ry, 197 1), 31-57.
"George Goo dwin , Jr. , " Th e Senio rity System in Co ngress," A merican Political Science
Review (Jun e, 1959), 412-436. For an argum ent suggesting that comm ittee chairmen tend to
mirror pa rty stre ngth and ideology, see Barbara Hinckley, The Seniority System Congress
(Bloo mington Indiana University Pr ess, I 97 1), especia lly chapte r 8.
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stronger than constituency variables. Table 2 gives the multiple regression
model based on these strongest predictors. Taken together, party, seniority,
religion, and urbanism explain 54.9 percent of the variance in FSS voting.
Independently, party explains 33.9 percent, religion adds 12.4 percent,
urban accounts for 6.3 percent, and-as expected-seniority adds only 2.3
percent to the total variance predicted.
The salience of religion as a social background variable is confirmed,
even though it is based on an uncomplicated dichotomy between
Jewish / Catholic Representatives and all others. The "liberalism" of Jewish
and Catholic Congressmen cannot be explained in terms of the economic
condition or the social class of all Jews and Catholics since the position of
Jews generally exceeds that of Catholics. One answer may lie in the history
of discrimination suffered by both groups in America. ' 9 The threat of antiSemitism and the tenents of the Jewish faith may foster liberalism in Jewish
Congressmen. The struggle of immigrant groups-like the Catholics-in
their quest for social mobility led many of them to enter the trade union
movement and to capitalize on the paternalism of big city political
machines. From this perspective, Jewish and Catholic Representatives may
be more supportive of governmental intervention to aid minorities and to
limit the privileges of established elites. To this extent, it would appear that
the nature of the belief systems of organized religion as weJI as the differential attraction of ethnic groups to certain religious denominations has an affect on voting behavior. In this light, moreover, arguments which
underestimate the "symbolic" or sociological importance of group
representation in Congress and stress only geographical representation may
need restructuring. Members of specific religious denominations may
transmit independent perceptions of issues, individual approaches to
problem-solving, and create new demands on Congress in behalf of their
clientele groups. 20
"See the chapter which analyze the political inclinations of Jews, Irish, Slavs, and Italians
in Mark R. Levy and Michael S. Kramer, The Ethnic Factor (New York: Simon and Schuster,
1973).
'°For example, see Leroy N. Rieselbach, "The Demograph y of the Congressional Vote on
Foreign Aid, 1939-1958," op. cit. Among the personal attributes he studied, only religion
strongly related to voting on foreign aid. Catholics were more supportive of foreign aid, and
Rieselbach suggests that "suc h programs may have appeared to Catholics as a means to assist
their homelands in time of economic crisis." Other discussions of this issue are found in:
Bernard Fensterwald, Jr ., "The Anatomy of American 'Isolationism' and Expansionism,"
Journal Conflict Resolution June and December, 1958), 111-138 and 280-309; John H. Fenton, The Catholic Vote (New Orleans: Hauser Press, 1960), 87-108.
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TABLE 2

Multiple Regression Model Showing Impact of Party , Religion, Urbanism,
and Seniority on Voting the Federal Support Score
Independent Multiple
Variables
R

R
Square

RSq
Chang e

Simple
R

.58259
.68063
.72544
.74093

.33942
.46325
.52626
.54897

.33942
. 12384
.06300
.02272

.58259 6.467109
.45465 3.688582
.40195 .7926693
.47964 .5687984
.6933314

Party
Religion
Urban
Seniorit y
(con stant)

B

Beta

F
Value

.41531
.24657
.26826
. 18157

108.623
46.486
57.384
20.650

This research suggests that social background variables can affect
voting behavior and that religion deserves to be studied as an independent
variable of importance. Its operation does not depend upon issue-specific
voting but rather affects voting behavior on numerous domestic, social
welfare issues associated with increased role of the federal government in
our economy and society.

